The Financial Crisis an Inside View--Let the Games Begin

Phillip Swagel, a former assistant Treasury secretary for economic policy under Henry Paulson, has written a 50 page paper that details the inner workings of the Treasury from December, 2006 through January, 2009. This is certain to be controversial once disected. Swagel will present the paper at the Brooking Institute Friday.

The Treasury predicted in May 2007 that “we were nearing the worst of it in terms of foreclosure starts” and the problem would subside after a peak in 2008. “What we missed is that the regressions didn’t use information on the quality of the underwriting of subprime mortgages in 2005, 2006 and 2007,” Swagel said. Very interesting that a former Treasury assistant would admit that the Treasury was clueless.

You can read the entire paper by following this link.

Or, for a cliff notes versioin you can cha cha over to the Wall Street Journal and read this piece--What Was Going on Inside the Paulson Treasury?

Let the finger pointing and revisionist history begin.

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Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism

Crafting a Bank Plan...No 'Lehman Weekends'

As I mentioned previously, Steve Liesman is one of my favorites. He has a good article up on the current government posture toward banks.

New details on the so-called bank stress test could be made available as soon as tomorrow, officials say. This process will gauge bank capital levels under worst-case economic scenarios than are currently seen. Details on those scenarios are likely to be made public on Wednesday.

Officials say there will also be some information about the “capital-access program” that will explain how banks can obtain government capital in the event of worst-case economic scenarios. Separate details of the public-private partnership will also be made available soon, but the timing is less clear.

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Crafting a Bank Plan...No 'Lehman Weekends'

While markets appear to be waiting for the hammer of government to come crashing down on the nation’s two largest banks, several government officials in interviews with CNBC on Sunday described a process in the works that is far more deliberative.

Some details will be made available this week, but parts of the plan will take weeks, months and even more than a year to play out as the Obama administration puts together a program that they hope will return banks to long-term health.

What is clear is that they are specifically trying to avoid “Lehman Weekends,” referring to the furious efforts in September when Lehman Bros. went bankrupty and AIG was bailed out. Officials stressed that there were no separate meetings going on surrounding Bank of America or Citigroup specifically and that the two banks would be treated under the broad plan now in the works.

Neither bank has asked for increased government assistance and one official said such assistance is not needed at this time.

Officials would not rule out increased or even outright government ownership of large banks at the end of the process, but they say their intent is to avoid that outcome and that it is anything but certain. They say the government does not want to be running these companies.

If the banks end up in government hands, officials say, the intent would be to get them into private hands quickly and do so in a way that is not much different from how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. currently resolves bank insolvencies, which typically take place over the weekend. The extent of government ownership, they say, will depend on the size of the losses at the banks, the access of banks to private capital and how the recession plays out.

Said one high-level official, “I think the market is missing that the whole intent of this process is to show that the banks have enough capital for even worse outcomes than we currently envision and to show there’s a program in place to give banks access to that capital if they need it.”

Several officials conceded that they have done a poor job in explaining the process to markets and that markets have, understandably, spun the darkest possible outcomes in the absence of information.

New details on the so-called bank stress test could be made available as soon as tomorrow, officials say. This process will gauge bank capital levels under worst-case economic scenarios than are currently seen. Details on those scenarios are likely to be made public on Wednesday.

Officials say there will also be some information about the “capital-access program” that will explain how banks can obtain government capital in the event of worst-case economic scenarios. Separate details of the public-private partnership will also be made available soon, but the timing is less clear.

The key misunderstanding in markets, officials believe, is how the public-private partnership will work and the way that new government capital, in the form of mandatory convertible preferred shares will become common equity.

One official said the public-private partnership will be voluntary so there will not be no mandate that banks offload assets at a loss. The official added that additional government capital will go into the banks as mandatory convertible preferred. Those shares remain preferred until realized losses and capital needs trigger conversion to common. As a result, the official said, the government may end up with a large stake in a given bank over a period of time, but it wont’ happen overnight.

As Wall Street braced for the worst, Bank of America lost 32 percent last week, closing at $3.79, a more than 24-year low.

Citigroup tumbled 46 percent last week to end at $1.95, an 18-year low.

Slideshow: Bank Failures of 2008

© 2009 CNBC, Inc. All Rights Reserved
URL: http://www.cnbc.com/id/29332236/

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25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis

Poll the Most Guilty

1. Angelo Mozilo – Co-founder and former head of Countrywide
2. Phil Gramm – Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee from 1995 through 2000
3. Alan Greenspan – Former chairman, Federal Reserve
4. Chris Cox – Former chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission
5. American Consumers
6. Hank Paulson – Former Secretary of the Treasury
7. Joe Cassano – Founding member, AIG’s financial-products unit
8. Ian McCarthy – CEO, Beazer Homes
9. Frank Raines - Former chairman and CEO, Fannie Mae
10. Kathleen Corbet – Former CEO, Standard & Poor’s
11. Dick Fuld – Former CEO, Lehman Brothers
12. Marion and Herb Sandler – Former heads, World Savings Bank
13. Bill Clinton – Former U.S. President
14. George W. Bush – Former U.S. President
15. Stan O’Neal – Former CEO, Merrill Lynch
16. Wen Jiabao – Premier, China
17. David Lereah – Former chief economist, National Association of Realtors
18. John Devaney – Hedge fund manager
19. Bernie Madoff – Ponzi scheme orchestrator
20. Lew Ranieri – Father of mortgage-backed securities
21. Burton Jablin – Programmer at Scripps Networks, which owns HGTV
22. Fred Goodwin – Former chairman and CEO, Royal Bank of Scotland
23. Sandy Weill – Former chairman and CEO, Citigroup
24. David Oddsson – Former Prime Minister, Iceland
25. Jimmy Cayne – Former chairman and CEO, Bear Stearns

Source: Time- Blameworthy

If you would like to vote in this Poll go here.

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Who Caused the Financial Crisis?

The cause of the financial crisis is likely to be debated for a long time. Most American's believe the crisis was caused by greedy Wall Street executives, shabby lending practices by mortgage companies and banks, and the deregulation of financial institutions by our elected representatives in Washington. No doubt there is plenty of blame to go around.


John Taylor, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, shares his perspective on the Wall Street Journal--

How Government Created the Financial Crisis.

The classic explanation of financial crises is that they are caused by excesses -- frequently monetary excesses -- which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. This crisis was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led to defaults, the implosion of mortgages and mortgage-related securities at financial institutions, and resulting financial turmoil.

Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom.

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How Government Created the Financial Crisis
Research shows the failure to rescue Lehman did not trigger the fall panic.
By JOHN B. TAYLOR

Many are calling for a 9/11-type commission to investigate the financial crisis. Any such investigation should not rule out government itself as a major culprit. My research shows that government actions and interventions -- not any inherent failure or instability of the private economy -- caused, prolonged and dramatically worsened the crisis.

The classic explanation of financial crises is that they are caused by excesses -- frequently monetary excesses -- which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. This crisis was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led to defaults, the implosion of mortgages and mortgage-related securities at financial institutions, and resulting financial turmoil.

Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom and the bust. Researchers at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have provided corroborating evidence from other countries: The greater the degree of monetary excess in a country, the larger was the housing boom.

The effects of the boom and bust were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of subprime and adjustable-rate mortgages, which led to excessive risk taking. There is also evidence the excessive risk taking was encouraged by the excessively low interest rates. Delinquency rates and foreclosure rates are inversely related to housing price inflation. These rates declined rapidly during the years housing prices rose rapidly, likely throwing mortgage underwriting programs off track and misleading many people.

Adjustable-rate, subprime and other mortgages were packed into mortgage-backed securities of great complexity. Rating agencies underestimated the risk of these securities, either because of a lack of competition, poor accountability, or most likely the inherent difficulty in assessing risk due to the complexity.

Other government actions were at play: The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were encouraged to expand and buy mortgage-backed securities, including those formed with the risky subprime mortgages.

Government action also helped prolong the crisis. Consider that the financial crisis became acute on Aug. 9 and 10, 2007, when money-market interest rates rose dramatically. Interest rate spreads, such as the difference between three-month and overnight interbank loans, jumped to unprecedented levels.

Diagnosing the reason for this sudden increase was essential for determining what type of policy response was appropriate. If liquidity was the problem, then providing more liquidity by making borrowing easier at the Federal Reserve discount window, or opening new windows or facilities, would be appropriate. But if counterparty risk was behind the sudden rise in money-market interest rates, then a direct focus on the quality and transparency of the bank's balance sheets would be appropriate.

Early on, policy makers misdiagnosed the crisis as one of liquidity, and prescribed the wrong treatment.

To provide more liquidity, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. Its main aim was to reduce interest rate spreads in the money markets and increase the flow of credit. But the TAF did not seem to make much difference. If the reason for the spread was counterparty risk as distinct from liquidity, this is not surprising.

Another early policy response was the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, passed in February. The major part of this package was to send cash totaling over $100 billion to individuals and families so they would have more to spend and thus jump-start consumption and the economy. But people spent little if anything of the temporary rebate (as predicted by Milton Friedman's permanent income theory, which holds that temporary as distinct from permanent increases in income do not lead to significant increases in consumption). Consumption was not jump-started.

A third policy response was the very sharp reduction in the target federal-funds rate to 2% in April 2008 from 5.25% in August 2007. This was sharper than monetary guidelines such as my own Taylor Rule would prescribe. The most noticeable effect of this rate cut was a sharp depreciation of the dollar and a large increase in oil prices. After the start of the crisis, oil prices doubled to over $140 in July 2008, before plummeting back down as expectations of world economic growth declined. But by then the damage of the high oil prices had been done.

After a year of such mistaken prescriptions, the crisis suddenly worsened in September and October 2008. We experienced a serious credit crunch, seriously weakening an economy already suffering from the lingering impact of the oil price hike and housing bust.

Many have argued that the reason for this bad turn was the government's decision not to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers over the weekend of Sept. 13 and 14. A study of this event suggests that the answer is more complicated and lay elsewhere.

While interest rate spreads increased slightly on Monday, Sept. 15, they stayed in the range observed during the previous year, and remained in that range through the rest of the week. On Friday, Sept. 19, the Treasury announced a rescue package, though not its size or the details. Over the weekend the package was put together, and on Tuesday, Sept. 23, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson testified before the Senate Banking Committee. They introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), saying that it would be $700 billion in size. A short draft of legislation was provided, with no mention of oversight and few restrictions on the use of the funds.

The two men were questioned intensely and the reaction was quite negative, judging by the large volume of critical mail received by many members of Congress. It was following this testimony that one really begins to see the crisis deepening and interest rate spreads widening.

The realization by the public that the government's intervention plan had not been fully thought through, and the official story that the economy was tanking, likely led to the panic seen in the next few weeks. And this was likely amplified by the ad hoc decisions to support some financial institutions and not others and unclear, seemingly fear-based explanations of programs to address the crisis. What was the rationale for intervening with Bear Stearns, then not with Lehman, and then again with AIG? What would guide the operations of the TARP?

It did not have to be this way. To prevent misguided actions in the future, it is urgent that we return to sound principles of monetary policy, basing government interventions on clearly stated diagnoses and predictable frameworks for government actions.

Massive responses with little explanation will probably make things worse. That is the lesson from this crisis so far.

Mr. Taylor, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of "Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis," published later this month by Hoover Press.

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Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis

Alan Blinder wrote an interesting article in the New York Times last week. He spells out in easy to understand terms the six errors that led us into this financial mess. He points out that if simple choices has been made along the way the situation would not be as dire as it is today. He goes on to point out that the current situation is not the failure of capitalism but about human errors. By putting a clear, concise "frame" around the current situation he makes it easier to understand. A better basic understanding of the problem would help our politicians in Washington to make decisions about how "taxpaper" money should and could be used to exacerbate the current financial problems.  The real issue right 

now is whether or not the way taxpayer money is being used is helping or just delaying the inevitable.

My list of errors has six whoppers, in chronologically order. I omit mistakes that became clear only in hindsight, limiting myself to those where prominent voices advocated a different course at the time. Had these six choices been different, I believe the inevitable bursting of the housing bubble would have caused far less harm.

Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis

By ALAN S. BLINDER

WHAT’S a nice economy like ours doing in a place like this? As the country descends into what is likely to be its worst postwar recession, Americans are distressed, bewildered and asking serious questions: Didn’t we learn how to avoid such catastrophes decades ago? Has American-style capitalism failed us so badly that it needs a radical overhaul?

The answers, I believe, are yes and no. Our capitalist system did not condemn us to this fate. Instead, it was largely a series of avoidable — yes, avoidable — human errors. Recognizing and understanding these errors will help us fix the system so that it doesn’t malfunction so badly again. And we can do so without ending capitalism as we know it.

My list of errors has six whoppers, in chronologically order. I omit mistakes that became clear only in hindsight, limiting myself to those where prominent voices advocated a different course at the time. Had these six choices been different, I believe the inevitable bursting of the housing bubble would have caused far less harm.

WILD DERIVATIVES In 1998, when Brooksley E. Born, then chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, sought to extend its regulatory reach into the derivatives world, top officials of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission squelched the idea. While her specific plan may not have been ideal, does anyone doubt that the financial turmoil would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired a zookeeper a decade ago?

SKY-HIGH LEVERAGE The second error came in 2004, when the S.E.C. let securities firms raise their leverage sharply. Before then, leverage of 12 to 1 was typical; afterward, it shot up to more like 33 to 1. What were the S.E.C. and the heads of the firms thinking? Remember, under 33-to-1 leverage, a mere 3 percent decline in asset values wipes out a company. Had leverage stayed at 12 to 1, these firms wouldn’t have grown as big or been as fragile.

A SUBPRIME SURGE The next error came in stages, from 2004 to 2007, as subprime lending grew from a small corner of the mortgage market into a large, dangerous one. Lending standards fell disgracefully, and dubious transactions became common.

Why wasn’t this insanity stopped? There are two answers, and each holds a lesson. One is that bank regulators were asleep at the switch. Entranced by laissez faire-y tales, they ignored warnings from those like Edward M. Gramlich, then a Fed governor, who saw the problem brewing years before the fall.

The other answer is that many of the worst subprime mortgages originated outside the banking system, beyond the reach of any federal regulator. That regulatory hole needs to be plugged.

FIDDLING ON FORECLOSURES The government’s continuing failure to do anything large and serious to limit foreclosures is tragic. The broad contours of the foreclosure tsunami were clear more than a year ago — and people like Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, were sounding alarms.

Yet the Treasury and Congress fiddled while homes burned. Why? Free-market ideology, denial and an unwillingness to commit taxpayer funds all played roles. Sadly, the problem should now be much smaller than it is.

LETTING LEHMAN GO The next whopper came in September, when Lehman Brothers, unlike Bear Stearns before it, was allowed to fail. Perhaps it was a case of misjudgment by officials who deemed Lehman neither too big nor too entangled — with other financial institutions — to fail. Or perhaps they wanted to make an offering to the moral-hazard gods. Regardless, everything fell apart after Lehman.

People in the market often say they can make money under any set of rules, as long as they know what they are. Coming just six months after Bear’s rescue, the Lehman decision tossed the presumed rule book out the window. If Bear was too big to fail, how could Lehman, at twice its size, not be? If Bear was too entangled to fail, why was Lehman not?

After Lehman went over the cliff, no financial institution seemed safe. So lending froze, and the economy sank like a stone. It was a colossal error, and many people said so at the time.

TARP’S DETOUR The final major error is mismanagement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the $700 billion bailout fund. As I wrote here last month, decisions of Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury secretary, about using the TARP’s first $350 billion were an inconsistent mess. Instead of pursuing the TARP’s intended purposes, he used most of the funds to inject capital into banks — which he did poorly.

To illustrate what might have been, consider Fed programs to buy commercial paper and mortgage-backed securities. These facilities do roughly what TARP was supposed to do: buy troubled assets. And they have breathed some life into those moribund markets. The lesson for the new Treasury secretary is clear: use TARP money to buy troubled assets and to mitigate foreclosures.

Six fateful decisions — all made the wrong way. Imagine what the world would be like now if the housing bubble burst but those six things were different: if derivatives were traded on organized exchanges, if leverage were far lower, if subprime lending were smaller and done responsibly, if strong actions to limit foreclosures were taken right away, if Lehman were not allowed to fail, and if the TARP funds were used as directed.

All of this was possible. And if history had gone that way, I believe that the financial world and the economy would look far less grim than they do today.

For this litany of errors, many people in authority owe millions of Americans an apology. Richard A. Clarke, former national security adviser, set a good example when he told the commission investigating the 9/11 attacks that he wanted victims’ families “to know why we failed and what I think we need to do to ensure that nothing like that ever happens again.” I’m waiting for similar words from our financial leaders, both public and private.

Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve. He has advised many Democratic politicians.

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